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Abstract
In this paper we study a principal-agent problem with two-stage complementary e¤orts, as
well as limited liability on the agents side. An interim-performance-evaluation (IPE) allows the
principal to learn of the degree of success of the rst stage investment. We nd conditions under
which such an IPE is protable even if the continuation action plan is constant regardless of the
IPE outcome. The conditions are related to the degree of task complementarity, which turns
out to have a close relationship between the comparison of the likelihood ratios under di¤erent
IPE outcomes. We also argue that notions such as morale and condence, which are normally
outside standard economic discourse, can be used to understand our results. This thus extends
the line of studies on intrinsic motivation versus extrinsic incentive pioneered by Bénabou and
Tirole (2003).
JEL: D82, L14, M20.
1 Introduction
In most real world problems, the successful production of a good normally requires sequential in-
vestments. For example, building a bridge requires planning and feasibility analysis in an early
stage and building of the bridge in a later stage; for another example, the completion of a doctoral
degree requires the student to take course work, to pass in a qualify exam, and to conduct research
and write a thesis of a reasonable quality. In many such examples, interim performance evaluations
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(IPEs) are performed. In the case of bridge building, the feasibility analysis may turn out to suggest
against building the bridge; in the case of doctoral studies, the qualify exam may turn out to advise
the doctoral student be dropped from the program. The merit of such IPEs is clear when they
provide new information and optimal continuation actions vary dependent on the IPE outcomes. A
less clear issue is whether they are still valuable when the principal aims at the same continuation
actions regardless of the IPE outcomes.
Warnings against the use of IPEs can be found among both economists and management re-
searchers. In his recent best seller, for instance, Roberts (2004) writes that "[s]ubjective measures
and milestones may provide more e¤ective incentives for innovation than do the accounting num-
bers, but using them to provide very intense incentives is certainly problematic." According to two
experts on project management, the risk of having IPEs is that the self-condence of the reviewees is
likely to be damaged when the IPEs turn out to be unfavorable. The reviewees are thus discouraged
from working hard. "There is little doubt that these swings of mood have a destructive e¤ect on
performance...despair is even worse because the project is permeated with an attitude that says,
Why try when we are destined to fail?"(Meredith and Mantel 1995).
The question of the value of IPEs also appears in recent research in contract theory. Lizzeri, Meyer
and Persico (2002), Fuchs (2007), and Manso (2011) contain results that support the aforementioned
concern. Specically, they show that, whenever the desired continuation action does not depend on
the IPE outcomes, it is better not to reveal them to the reviewees. By not revealing, there is no need
to provide di¤erential incentives depending on the IPE outcomes (another way put, fewer incentive
compatibility constraints need to be satised).
In this paper, we set out to study the issue through a simple two-stage principal-agent problem.
The principal solicits the agents help to produce a nal good which may turn out to be a success
or a failure. The success probability depends on two non-observable e¤orts made by the agent
sequentially. The focus of analysis is where the two e¤orts exhibit complementarity that is, a
higher level of e¤ort 1 makes the e¤ort 2 more productive and vice versa. We also assume that,
while both the parties are risk neutral, the agent su¤ers from limited liability. We think that limited
liability is a reasonsable assumption in many applications. The benchmark model is a so-called
traditional contract which conditions the payment to the agent on the quality of the nal good.
Given this benchmark, we study a contract in which payments to the agent depend not only on
the nal product quality but also on the outcome of an IPE conducted at the end of the rst stage.
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For simplicity, we assume that the principal can conduct an IPE costlessly, and the IPE outcome
informs the principal about the success probability of the nal good. A positive (negative) outcome
means a high (low) probability of success and, given our assumption of e¤ort complementarity,
the increment of success probability due to the second stage e¤ort is large (small) and this thus
boosts (damages) the agents morale. Our model allows us to understand the trade-o¤ between the
benecial e¤ect when his morale is boosted and the harmful e¤ect when his morale is damaged.
The main results are the following. First, we show that, given the same continuation e¤ort
regardless of the IPE outcome, the IPE contract and the traditional contract are generally not
equivalent. Second and more specically, we nd out the conditions under which the former is more
protable the latter. One necessary condition is that the use of IPE does not introduce additional
binding IC constraints to the problem. One necessary condition is that the likelihood ratios of the
second e¤ort do not di¤er too much under di¤erent IPE outcomes, which is the case when e¤ort
complementarity is weak. On the contrary, when the complementarity is strong, or when the two
likelihood ratios di¤er a lot, using IPE is never optimal given the same continuation e¤ort regardless
of the IPE outcome.
Third, we show that IPEs are less likely to be valuable when IPE outcomes are subjective and
the principal may have an incentive to lie about the ndings. Nonetheless, we nd that parameter
values still exist over which having IPEs is more protable than not having them.
Fourth, we also characterize the IPE contracts when the continuation e¤orts depend on the IPE
outcomes. Naturally this makes IPE more likely to be useful. While this is not surprising, it is
still interesting comparing the di¤erence between the optimal IPE contract given such a variable
continuation action plan with the one given the same continuation action plan.
Fifth and nally, we nd notions such as morale and condence, which are normally outside
standard economic discourse, to be helpful in interpreting our results. With a lower morale or self-
condence, the agent needs to be motivated with greater-powered incentive. Bénabou and Tirole
(2003) are the rst to formulate self-condence and to study the potentially harmful e¤ect of high-
powered incentives. As the principal-agent problem we study is even more standard that theirs, rhis
paper echos their call for using economic modeling to analyze problems psychologists are interested
in. We think that notions such as morale and self-condence have their justiable places in even
broader economic environments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We will discuss related literature at the end
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of this section. Section 2 lays out the basic model. Section 3 analyzes objective IPE contracts and
evaluates their value; an objective IPE is an IPE that is veriable and this comes naturally as the
rst step of our analysis. Sections 4 analyzes the same for subjective IPE contracts and evaluates
their value. Section 5 discusses and deals with some extensions. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature This paper is related to a nascent and growing literature on IPE. Lizzeri,
Meyer and Persico (2002) pioneer this research by studying how the (objective) IPE impacts the
incentive of the agent. In a model where the outputs are independently generated at each stage, they
show that the principal is hurt by conducting an IPE if she plans to induce any given level of e¤orts.
By presenting another model, Ray (2007a) nds that IPE enhances e¢ ciencies by providing the
choice of ending the projects with low early returns. His key assumptions were that the production
is indivisible and e¤orts across stages are perfect substitutes. In contrast with these two papers,
our model assumes complementarity between the e¤orts across stages, and identies a di¤erent
trade-o¤ of conducting IPE: the interim feedback, once the principal makes use of it in planning or
control, would a¤ect the agents morale. Furthermore, by stressing the subjectivity of evaluation,
we characterize the conditions under which contracting with or without IPE might be the optimal
strategy.
In another related paper, Manso (2010) shows that when implementing a task with inter-period
complementarity (such as "exploration"), the principal should provide (objective) feedback to the
agent; but when implementing a task without such interdependence (such as "exploitation"), not
providing the feedback is the optimal strategy.1 Since our main concern is the desirability of provid-
ing subjective feedback, which is less benecial than the objective feedback due to the extra di¢ culty
of information disclosure, Mansos analysis justies our focus on a model with complementary tasks.
In other words, Mansos nding obviates the need to study the subjective IPE in a model with
independent tasks, because such evaluation is always undesirable.
Midterm reviews have also received signicant notice in the recent literature on dynamic tour-
nament. Some of these papers, including Yildirim (2005), Aoyagi (2008), Goltsman and Mukherjee
(2009), Ederer (forthcoming), try to characterize the optimal strategy of interim information disclo-
sure in the context of a two-stage tournament. Moreover, Gershkov and Perry (2009), while keeping
1According to Manso (2010), under "exploration", the probability of success in the second period is higher if the
experimentation in the rst period is successful; however, under "exploitation", the probability of success in each
period is independent.
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a xed disclosure policy, investigate the optimal aggregation and compensation rules in a tournament
with or without midterm reviews. However, our model is built upon the standard principal-agent set-
ting, instead of with multiple-agent competition. Another di¤erence is that the contracting problem
in our model goes hand in hand with information disclosure and morale formation.
Another relevant strand of literature is on subjective evaluation. By assuming the exogenous
correlation between the principals and the agents beliefs, MacLeod (2003) nds that subjective
evaluation results in the compression of performance levels. Motivated by relational contracts,
Levin (2003) argues that if a subjective evaluation reveals low performance, the long-run relationship
should be terminated in order to alleviate the moral hazard problem on the part of the agent and
simultaneously prevent the adverse selection problem on the part of the principal.2 In contrast, we
take a closer look at the subjective evaluation on the interim product, instead of the nal product.
The most distinctive feature is that both the principals and the agents beliefs of the project potential
are reshaped by such an appraisal. For example, a negative feedback not only causes the agents
morale to drop, but also hinders the principal from further inducing e¤orts. In this sense, surplus
burning is a natural consequence of the midterm review rather than something by construction.
2 The model
An agent is hired by a principal to complete a two-stage project. In Stage 1, the agent exerts an
unobservable e¤ort e1 2 f0; 1g with a cost c1e1, where c1 > 0; at the end of the stage, an interim
product of quality x1 2 f0; 1g is generated and the quality is high (i.e., x1 = 1) with probability
r0 + r1e1 or low (i.e., x1 = 0) with the remaining probability, where r0 2 (0; 1) and r1 2 (0; 1  r0).
In Stage 2, the agent can make another unobservable e¤ort e2 2 f0; 1g with a cost c2e2, where
c2 > 0; at the end of the stage, a nal product is generated with quality x2 2 f0; 1g.
If the interim product is of high quality, the nal product is a "good" (i.e., x2 = 1) with
probability t0 + t1e2 or a "bad" (i.e., x2 = 0) with the remaining probability, where t0 2 (0; 1) and
t1 2 (0; 1  t0); if the interim product is of low quality, however, the nal product is a "good" with
probability t00+ t
0
1e2 or a "bad" with the remaining probability, where t
0
0 2 (0; 1) and t01 2 (0; 1  t00).
The denition a high-quality interim product We assume that t0  t00 to accord with the denition
of a high-quality interim product and that t1 > t01 so that there is complementarity between e¤orts
2Fuchs (2007) extends the analyses of MacLeod (2003) and Levin (2003) to a dynamic environment, and charac-
terizes the optimal timing of evaluation and the optimal rule of termination.
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across stages.3
The nature of the nal product is observable and veriable, and the principal gains from the
project a value of B > 0 in the case of a nal "good" and a value of zero in the case of a nal "bad."
We assume that both the principal and the agent are risk-neutral, and that there is no discounting
across stages. However, the agent has no wealth and is protected by limited liability; his reservation
utility is assumed to be zero.
Although not immediately observable, x1 can be learned through an IPE. Specically, subsequent
to its realization but prior to Stage 2, the principal has an option of arranging an evaluation through
which she obtains a signal  2 fH;Lg that perfectly reveals x1. Projects tting our model can
be found in many industries such as construction and software development. The potential safety
problems of bridges under construction or possible bugs in an unnished software are not easily
known unless the project manager undertakes interim checkups. On the properties of evaluation,
we make two assumptions for simplicity. First, we assume that the cost of the evaluation is zero.
Obviously, any positive cost will simply reduce the net gains of doing the IPE by the same amount.
Second, we assume the evaluation contains no noise; at the end of this paper, we will discuss the
impacts of a noisy IPE on the optimal contracting.
The timing of this game is summarized in Figure 1. At the outset, the principal determines
whether to conduct an IPE, and proposes and signs a take-it-or-leave-it contract with the agent.
The production process goes through Stage 1 and Stage 2 sequentially. In case an IPE is scheduled,
it will take place at the end of Stage 1, followed by a feedback m provided by the principal to the
agent.
In case an IPE is not scheduled, the contract will only be contingent on the veriable nature of
the nal product, x2. So it is represented by a duple (w; b), where w is a wage rate that must be
3We could show that, in this model, if t1 < t01, the e¤orts between the two stages are substitutes; if t1 = t
0
1,
the two-stage e¤orts are independent; if t1 > t01, the e¤orts between the two stages are complements. In our model,
the complementarity may result from the fact that satisfactory completion of previous phases lays the foundation for
proceeding to the next phase; Manso (2010) also argues that complementarity naturally arises when the principal
tries to design a contract for "exploration."
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The principal
decides whether
to conduct IPE
and contracts
with the agent
Stage 2Stage 1
The agent
chooses e1
An interim product
is generated
The agent
chooses e2
Project ends, final
product is revealed,
payments are made
IPE, if scheduled, is
undertaken, and the
principal provides a
feedback m
Figure 1: The timeline of the game with the option of an IPE.
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paid out and b is a bonus paid out if and only if x2 = 1. The agents limited liability dictates that4
w  0; b+ w  0: (1)
We call such a contract a "traditional contract." We use he1; e2i to denote the corresponding action
plan, where e1 and e2 are the agents e¤orts in Stage 1 and Stage 2.
In case an IPE is scheduled, the choice of contract is enriched because it could be written
contingent not only on x2 but also on the interim feedback m (disclosed by the principal). There
are two scenarios: the IPE may be objective so that the IPE outcome, denoted by , is publicly
observable and veriable, or it may be subjective so that  is the principals private information.
Without loss of generality, for both types of IPEs, we assume that the set of all possible messages
that the principal may utter equals fH;Lg. Thus, the contract is represented by a quadruple
(wH ; wL; bH ; bL), where, given feedback m, wm is the wage rate paid out to the agent regardless of
x2 and bm is the additional bonus paid out if x2 = 1. The limited liability constraints dictate that
wH ; wL  0; bH + wH  0; bL + wL  0: (2)
We call such a contract a "milestone contract." Note that the Stage-2 e¤ort would be conditional
on the feedback; we denote the corresponding implemented action plan as he1; e2 (H) ; e2 (L)i. To
facilitate our exposition, we make the following denition.
Denition 1 A milestone contract is called an e¤ort-sorting scheme if it implements the action
plan h1; 1; 0i.
Given contract , we use V  to denote the expected revenue accruing to the principal, C to
denote the expected cost she incurs, and  to denote her expected payo¤; so we have   V  C.
Without the IPE, our model is just a variant of the hidden-action model with limited liability,
which is a building block of many recent papers on the agency problem (e.g., Crémer 1995, Che and
Yoo 2001, Schmitz 2005, etc.). In the context of procurement and project management, the assump-
tion of limited liability is quite reasonable because the agents are usually protected by bankruptcy
4We implicitly assume that w is paid out along with b (if rewarded) at the very end. It is possible that w is paid out
at the interim, whereas b is paid out at the end of the project. In this case, one may consider a more restrictive limited-
liability constraint, which requires that b be non-negative. As later analysis will show, this alternative treatment of
limited liability will not change any results, because the optimal choice of b in any contract constrained by the less
restrictive limited-liability constraints (e.g., (1) or (2)) is not lower than 0.
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laws (see, e.g., Calveras, Ganuza and Hauk 2004). Like Schmitz (2005), we make the following
assumption, in order to simplify the exposition and avoid tedious case distinctions.
Assumption 1.
c1
c2
 min

r1t0
t1
;
r1 (t0   t00)
(r0 + r1) t1 + (1  r0   r1) t01

and
B  maxB0; B00	 ;
where
B0  [(r0 + r1) (t0 + t1) + (1  r0   r1) (t
0
0 + t
0
1)] c2
[(r0 + r1) t1 + (1  r0   r1) t01]2
  [(r0 + r1) t0 + (1  r0   r1) t
0
0] c1
r1 (t0   t00) [(r0 + r1) t1 + (1  r0   r1) t01]
; and
B00  [(r0 + r1) (t0 + t1) + (1  r0   r1) (t
0
0 + t
0
1)] c2
[(r0 + r1) t1 + (1  r0   r1) t01]
 1f[(r0 + r1) (t0 + t1) + (1  r0   r1) (t00 + t01)]  [r0t0 + (1  r0) t00]g
:
In particular, the assumption guarantees that the principal will implement h1; 1i in absence of
any IPE, and that the agent, potentially shirking, is more likely to shade his e¤ort in Stage 2 than
in Stage 1. If Assumption 1 is not satised, the analysis is analogical to what follows. However,
no additional insights are gained. (Note that the IPE is more likely to inuence the belief and
incentive of the agent in the post-evaluation stage. So the assumption restricts attention to the
most interesting case, in which the Stage-2 Incentive Compatible constraint is more likely to be
binding. We will come back to discuss what happens if c1=c2 becomes large.)
Under Assumption 1, the optimal traditional contract should implement h1; 1i. Denote the
contract by T . One can easily verify that wT = 0, and
bT =
c2
(r0 + r1) t1 + (1  r0   r1) t01
; (3)
with corresponding implementation cost
CT =
[(r0 + r1) (t0 + t1) + (1  r0   r1) (t00 + t01)] c2
(r0 + r1) t1 + (1  r0   r1) t01
: (4)
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3 Objective milestone contract
In this section we study the scenario in which the IPE is objective. In this case, the message uttered
by the principal will be the same as the IPE outcome, and there is no incentive problem whether
the principal will lie or not. Before discussing any specic contract, we show the following property.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the IPE is objective. For any action plan, to characterize the optimal
contract, it is without loss of generality focusing on the case where wL = wH = 0:
Holding wH ; bL, and bH constant, an increase in wL leads to a higher expected cost to be paid
out, while also weakening the agents incentive to exert e¤ort in the rst stage. It is thus undesirable.
In our setting, wH and bH are equally e¤ective in making the rst stage IC constraint bind. However,
it can be shown that, however, when the IPE outcome contains noisy signal about the quality of
the intermediate good, than using bH is more cost e¤ective than using wH . The reason is that the
signal generated by the IPE cannot be a more precise indicator of the nal product than the nal
production itself, and that setting a reward contingent on  = H alone (e.g., using wages) is less
desirable than deferring such a reward until the whole project is successfully completed (e.g., using
bonus).5 Therefore, focusing on the case where wH = 0 is not only without loss of generality, but
also is also robust to the introduction of some small noise to the IPE outcome.
In what follows, we turn to the optimal milestone contracts that implement h1; 1; 1i and h1; 1; 0i,
denoted by O1 and O0, respectively.
3.1 Implementing h1; 1; 1i
We now characterize O1. Consider the agents second stage decision. Given a H signal (hence the
same message uttered by the principal), the agent prefers choosing e2 = 1 to choosing e2 = 0, if and
only if
bH  c2
t1
; (5)
where t1bH is the expected benet of exerting stage-2 e¤ort and c2 is the cost of the e¤ort. This
condition is in fact a very familiar equation in moral hazard problem with limited liability constraint.
5Consider the extreme case in which the IPE signal is H with probability 1/2 regardless of the quality of the
interim product. Then while increasing the cost to the principal, any increase in wH will have no e¤ect in motivating
the agent to exert e1 = 1. On the other hand, an increase in bH will certainly make choosing e1 = 1 more attractive
for the agent.
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In a similar token, given a L signal, the agent prefers choosing e2 = 1 to choosing e2 = 0, if and
only if
bL  c2
t01
: (6)
Notice that, because t1 > t01, the minimum bonus that motivates the agent to work hard in stage 2
is greater when L signal is received. The intuition is that now that the agent has low morale, or is
less condent about the project, he has to be given greater incentive.
The last IC constraint to check is that the agent has no deviation motive in stage 1. At the
outset, foreseeing that he will choose e2 = 1 for certainty, the agent prefers choosing e1 = 1 to
choosing e1 = 0 if and only if
r1 (t0 + t1) bH   r1 (t00 + t01) bL + r1 (wH   wL)  c1: (7)
Notice that an increase in bL makes this condition more di¢ cult to hold. Taken into account
wH = wL = 0, the condition is found to be equivalent to
bH  c1
r1 (t0 + t1)
+
(t00 + t
0
1) c2
(t0 + t1) t01
: (8)
In case this minimum bH exceeds that one calculated in (5), then the purpose of bH is to motivate
stage 1 e¤ort, rather than to motivate stage 2 e¤ort under H signal.6 It should be noticed that
Assumption 1 itself does not preclude the possibility of the RHS of (8) exceeding the RHS of (5). It
suggests a potential cost of using IPE because now additional constraints need to be satised. The
following proposition summarizes the characterization of this IPE contract.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the IPE is objective. O1 satises wH = wL = 0,bL = c2=t01 and
bH = max

c2
t1
;
c1
r1 (t0 + t1)
+
(t00 + t
0
1) c2
(t0 + t1) t01

:7 (9)
We now examine if O1 is more protable than T is. Because both O1 and T correspond to
the same action plan (hence the same expected revenue), the question becomes whether O1 leads
6 It can be shown that any other IC constraints are satised so long as the three aforementioned three IC constraints
are satised.
7 In case the second term in the RHS of (9) is greater, any contract that satises wL = 0; bL = c2=t01; bH 2
c2
t1
; c1
r1(t0+t1)
+
(t00+t
0
1)c2
(t0+t1)t
0
1

and wH =
c1
r1
+
(t00+t
0
1)c2
t01
  (t0 + t1) bH is outcome equivalent and is also optimal.
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to lowering of the expected cost. Denote the cost under O1 and T by CO1 and CT , respectively.
Dening H = (r0 + r1) (t0 + t1) and L = (1  r0   r1) (t00 + t01), then we have
CO1 = HbH + LbL and CT = HbT + LbT :
To x idea, suppose bH indeed equals c2=t1 (so that the IC constraint that prevents deviation to
h0; 1; 1i is nonbinding, or (8) can be ignored). Then we have bH < bT < bL. Hence, a switching from
T to O1 results in a reduction of cost when H is observed (benecial e¤ect) but an increase in cost
when L is observed (harmful e¤ect). O1 leads to a greater agency cost if the latter, harmful e¤ect is
dominant. Notice that, as t01 decreases, bL increases without a nite upper bound (while bH remains
unchanged and bT increases with a nite upper bound). Hence, the harmful e¤ect must be dominant
for su¢ ciently small t01, and one can easily nd parameter values such that O1 increases the agency
cost. What is more interesting is we can also nd parameter values such that the converse is true.
The following proposition formally states the result.
Proposition 2 1. Suppose t
0
1
t00
< t1t0 : Then the implementation cost of O1 is strictly greater than
that of T:
2. Suppose t
0
1
t00
> t1t0 : Then there exists R
 > 0 such that for all c1 < Rc2; the implementation
cost of O1 is strictly lower than that of T:
Notice that t01=t
0
0 (t1=t0) is the ratio of additional success probability over the default success
probability of stage 2s e¤ort given signal L (signal H). Result 1 states that if this ratio is lower
under signal L than under signal H, it is not worthwhile conducting IPE. The intuition is that it is
too costly to motivate an agent under signal L (or the limited liability rent under IPE is too large).
Result 2 states that, if the ratio is greater under signal L than under signal H, it may be worthwhile
conducting IPE.8 The restriction to c1 < Rc2 is to make sure that bH indeed equals c2=t1 and the
IC constraint that prevents deviation to h0; 1; 1i is nonbinding. In this case, doing IPE is benecial.
In case the IC constraint is binding, however, the bH exceeds c2=t1 and the cost CO1 calculated
above assuming bH = c2=t1 is an underestimation of the true cost. Benecial IPE is not guaranteed.
To summarize, there are two reasons why CO1 may exceed CT . First, the increase in bonus
8We also know from the literature on agency problem with limited liability (e.g., Schmitz 2005) that the rent is
positively related to the default probability of success and negatively related to the success probability added by e¤ort,
so the ratios of t0=t1 and t00=t
0
1 dictate the limited liability rent by revealing H and L, respectively.
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under L signal is too high for the reduction in bonus under H signal to fully compensate. Second,
the reduction of bonus under H signal may be not as large as initially expected; the result is that,
compared with traditional contracting, additional IC constraints are introduced in CO1 and some of
them may require a bH greater than is required solely to motivate the stage 2 e¤ort under H signal.
3.2 Implementing h1; 1; 0i
We now characterize O0. Like O1, O0 should still prescribe that wH = wL = 0. bL should be made
as low as zero because, given action plan h1; 1; 0i, there is no need to motivate the agent to work
hard when knowing  = L. bH should still satisfy (5) so that the agent will not deviate to e2 = 0
when knowing  = H. The last thing to check is that at the outset the agent has no incentive to
deviate to action plan h0; 1; 0i. This condition, after plugging wH = wL = 0 (from Lemma 1) and
bL = 0 (obviously the case), is thus equivalent to
bH  c1 + r1c2
r1 (t0 + t1)
(10)
Thus bH should be the maximum of this term and c2=t1. But, interestingly, this term is always less
than c2=t1 given Assumption 1.9 As a result, O0 is characterized as follows:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the IPE is objective. O0 is characterized by wH = wL = bL = 0 and
bH =
c2
t1
:
The comparison of agency cost between O0 and T is fairly straightforward.
Proposition 4 There exists a cuto¤ BO such that O0 yields a higher (lower) level of prot to the
principal than T if B < BO (B > BO). Moreover, this cuto¤ BO is increasing in c2; t00; and t0, and
decreasing in t01.
The intuition is straightforward. Compared with T , the e¤ort sorting scheme O0 brings in a
smaller revenue but also incurs lower costs. While the reduction in revenue is propositional to B,
the reduction in costs is independent of B. Thus, O0 is attractive only when the rst (detrimental)
e¤ect is low enough, i.e., when the project value B is low enough.
9The RHS of (10) is smaller than the RHS of (8). In other words, the incentive to shirk in the rst stage is lower
under O0 than under O1. The reason is as follows. Under O1, the agent, even after shirking in stage 1, will still be
induced to work hard under L-signal, via an attractive bonus bL = c2=t01 > c2=t1. Under O0, no such incentive is
available under L-signal. As a result, it becomes more attractive for the agent to shirk under O1 than under O0.
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The comparative statics state that O0 is more desirable, if the ratio of t00=t
0
1 is higher. A larger
ratio of t00=t
0
1 is associated with greater limited liability rents, when inducing continuation e¤ort upon
an interim product of low quality. The traditional contract T does not rely on an IPE, but indeed
induces e2 = 1 upon an interim product of low quality. Hence, a rise in the ratio of t00=t
0
1 increases
the average rent paid to the agent. However, the e¤ort-sorting scheme, by ceasing to inducing any
e¤ort after revealing L, does not su¤ers from this problem. Thus a rise in the ratio of t00=t
0
1 favors
the use of e¤ort sorting.10 The comparative statics with respect to t0 is due to fact that a greater
t0 leads to greater rents when H signal is observed. Although CO0 and CT increase in t0, the
latter increases more rapidly in t0; the reason is that when working upon an interim product of high
quality, the bonus, as well as limited liability rent, is reduced if a positive feedback is provided.11
3.3 The value of IPE contracts
Thus far, we have characterized O1 and O0 and compared each with respect to T . What remains to
be done is the nd out the optimal contract when IPE option is available but need not be adopted
in the contract. A second question is how this optimal contract performs with respect to the rst
best.
For both questions, we can put down our analysis using a graphical method (refer to gure 2).
The horizontal axis ist01, over which our attention is that t
0
1 < t1 so that e¤orts are complementarity.
The vertical axis is B and we focus on the range that assumption 1 is satised, and we assume other
parameters (c1, and c2) are unchanged in the exercise. The whole space in the gure thus represents
the parameter range over which T is the optimal traditional contract.
Optimal contract Given Assumption 1, we can verify that the optimal IPE contract would be
either O1 or O0.12 Notice that between these two contracts, the principal will choose the former
10A smaller t01 not only enlarges the saving on the limited liablity rent but also reduces the expected revenue loss
of e¤ort sorting.
11The comparative static with respect to to t1 is more complicated, because it also determines the degree of
complementarity between e¤orts across stages.
12Other action plans are not optimal. The reasons are as follows. First, inducing h1; 0; 1i is less desirable than
inducing h1; 1; 0i. The latter allows the principal to not only reap a greater expected revenue but also curtail a greater
expected cost, because the agent is now motivated by an optimistic belief to choose a high Stage-2 e¤ort. Second,
inducing h1; 0; 0i is less desirable than inducing h1; 1; 1i, simply because traditional contract implementing h1; 0i is
dominated by that implementing h1; 1i given Assumption 1 . Third, inducing a low e¤ort in Stage 1, e.g., the action
plan h0; y; zi, is never optimal; this is further guaranteed by Assumption 1 : when c1=c2 is su¢ ciently low and the
project is su¢ ciently valuable, the principal will not benet from a low Stage-1 e¤ort.
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over the latter if its extra benet more than o¤sets its extra cost, which is equivalent to
B > eB  t00 + t01
(t01)
2 c2:
This eB is decreasing in t01, intersecting BO from above when t01 = (t00=t01)t1.Thus with the help
of our earlier propositions, the space can be partitioned into four regions, using the vertical line
t01 = (t
0
1=t0)t1 and the downward slopping line B
O. In the bottom left region, the optimal contract
is O0; in the top left region, the optimal contract is T ; in the top right region, the optimal contract is
O1; nally, in the bottom right region, the optimal contract is O0. This thus completely characterizes
the optimal contract when IPE is available and need not be chosen.
comparison with rst best Now we turn to the comparison with the rst best. Note that
given assumption 1, the rst best dictates that either h1; 1; 1i or h1; 1; 0i will be implemented. The
former is chosen over the latter i¤ its extra benet more than o¤sets its extra cost. The condition
is equivalent to
B > B  c2
t01
;
which is a downward slopping line in the Figure. One can easily show that B < eB and B < BO.
As a result, the space can be divided into three bands. In the top and bottom bands, the principals
choice is as e¢ cient as the rst best. In the middle band, the principal implements h1; 1; 0i while the
rst best is to implement h1; 1; 1i so there is an underinvestment problem and the availability of IPE
reduces e¢ ciency compared with traditional contracting. In the bottom band, the principals choice
accords with the rst best so the availability of IPE improves e¢ ciency compared with traditional
contracting.
3.4 Relationship with the literature
We end with some discussion with the literature. According to Ray (2007a) and Manso (2010),
providing the (objective) feedback is benecial for the principal, if it helps her screen out bad
projects or provide proper incentives for "exploration." Such advantage of IPE can be translated
into the implementation of "e¤ort-sorting" scheme in our setting: the conduct of IPE can let the
Stage-2 e¤ort contingent on the Stage-1 outcome. Moreover, we nd that the e¤ort-sorting scheme
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payo¤ dominates the traditional contract only under certain condition, which is favored by a smaller
B or a larger ratio of t01=t
0
0.
However, our nding contrasts with Lizzeri, Meyer and Persico (2002), in the sense that for
inducing any given action plan, the revelation of feedback can reduce the implementation cost under
some condition, instead of enhancing the cost always. The di¤erence is caused by the fact that
we assume the complementarity between e¤orts across stages. We indeed consider a more general
framework, by emphasizing the ratio of success probability that is key to the agency problem with
limited liability. The linkage between our model and Lizzeri, Meyer and Persico (2002) can also be
established: if t01 is larger than
t00
t0
t1, we nd that O1 payo¤ dominates T . However, if t01 increases
close to t1, the Stage-1 and Stage-2 e¤orts tend to be independent. In this case, the cost advantage
of O1, relative to T , vanishes.
4 Subjective milestone contract
In this section we study the scenario in which the IPE is subjective. The principal is now tempted
to lie or to hide the signal from the agent and hence the contracting problem is complicated by
this adverse selection problem. We focus on milestone contracts with the following full-revealing
property.
Denition 2 A milestone contract is said to satisfy the full-revealing property, if the message m
announced by the principal is consistent with the true signal  learnt in the subjective IPE.
In other words, the new contracting problem is now constrained by additional "truth-telling"
conditions. We focus on the optimal milestone contracts that implement h1; 1; 1i and h1; 1; 0i; we
denote the two contracts by S1 and S0, respectively.
4.1 Implementing h1; 1; 1i
To implement h1; 1; 1i, the cost-minimization problem confronting the principal is the same as the
case of objective IPE, except that the following two truth-telling constraints are added.
(t0 + t1) (bL   bH)  wH   wL; (11)
(t00 + t
0
1) (bL   bH)  wH   wL: (12)
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(11) states that, even if the agent was to believe in the principal, the principal would not benet
from lying to have received signal L when she had actually received H; (12) is the corresponding
condition so that the principal would not benet from lying to have received signal H when she had
actually received L. We can verify that, given contract O1, (12) is violated and (11) is not ; i.e., the
principal will have an incentive to lie when receiving L signal but no incentive to lie when receiving
H signal.
As it will be shown, the optimal contract will still entail wL = 0 and bL = c2t01 ; an increase
in wL or bL will only increase the expected cost and worsen the IC constraint (12). What may
be di¤erent are the choices of wH and bH . For that purpose, we can represent their choices in a
(bH ; wH) diagram (see Figure 3). (11) is satised for all (bH ; wH) below the H-line; (12) is satised
for all (bH ; wH) above the L-line. Notice that both lines have a horizontal intercept of c2=t01. An
additional constraint, bH  c2=t1, is depicted which is to ensure e2 = 1 upon the agent receiving
a high message. Given that IC is always on the left hand side of the common horizontal intercept
of the H-line and L-line, there always exists a shaded region over which all three constraints are
satised. it is straightforward to verify that the optimal (bH ; wH) is the dotted point within the
shaded region.
Proposition 5 Suppose c1=c2 is su¢ ciently small. Then h1; 1; 1i is always implementable and S1
satises wL = 0; bL = c2t01 ; bH = c2=t1; and wH = (t
0
0 + t
0
1)

c2
t01
  c2t1

:
The condition c1=c2 is to ensure that we can ignore the IC constraint that prevents deviation to
action plan h0; 1; 1i so that the only relevant constraints are (5), (6), (11), and (12). Not only simpli-
fying the characterization of S1, this assumption also ensures that h1; 1; 1i is indeed implementable.
When c1=c2 is not su¢ ciently small, bH may be made larger to ensure no deviation to action plan
h0; 1; 1i. That means the IC line will move rightward and hence the existence of the shaded region
in Figure 3 is no longer guaranteed.
The characterization of S1 has interesting properties. The contract is the same as O1, except
that wH is made large enough to ensure that the principal has no lying incentive when receiving a
L signal. In principle, her honesty can also be ensured with an increase in bH (or a simultaneous
increase of both bH and wH) but that is not most cost e¤ective from the principals point of view.
The intuition is as follows. The L line in the diagram has a slope of t00 + t
0
1 in absolute term. That
is, the principal will remain to have no incentive to lie under signal-L when wH is increased by one
18
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and bH is reduced by 1=(t00 + t
0
1). On the other hand, the principals expected cost remains same
when wH is increased by one unit and bH is decreased by 1=(t0 + t1) < 1=( t00 + t
0
1). This explains
why using wH is more cost e¤ective than using wH .
It is less likely that h1; 1; 1i is implemented at a lower cost under T when IPE is subjective.
Despite its restrictiveness, benecial S1 is not impossible. The following proposition summaries this
result.
Proposition 6 There exists parameters under which S1 exists and the expected cost is lower than
that under T .
4.2 Implementing h1; 1; 0i
To implement h1; 1; 0i, the cost-minimization problem confronting the principal is the same as the
case of objective IPE, except that the following two truth-telling constraints are added.
(t0 + t1) (B   bH)  wH  t0 (B   bL)  wL; (13)
t00 (B   bL)  wL  (t00 + t01) (B   bH)  wH : (14)
(13) states that, even if the agent was to believe the principal, the principal would not benet
from lying to have received signal L when she has actually received H; (14) is the corresponding
condition so that the principal would not benet from lying to have received signal H when she has
actually received L.
The analysis of the optimal IPE contract is similar is the case of S1, using a graphical method.
It is conceivable that wL = 0 and bL = 0 as in O0; an increase in either of them would only increase
the expected cost as well as making (14) more di¢ cult to hold. Then the question boils down to
nding a pair of bH and wH . Using a graphical method as we did for S1, we depict three constraints
(5), (13), and (14).13 Notice that now in general H-line and L-line do not have a common horizontal
intercept. When t
0
1
t00
> t1t0 , the H-lines horizontal intercept is smaller. A shaded region exists that
satisfying all three constraints if and only if the IC line is on the left hand of the interception point
of the H-line and L-line (see the rst panel of gure 4). When t
0
1
t00
< t1t0 , the H-lines horizontal
13The analysis so far has ignored other IC constraints on the agent, in particular, the one that prevents him from
deviation to action plan 010. However, from the analysis of O0, we learned that this constraint will not be binding so
our analysis is justied.
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Figure 4: Two cases to consider when characterizing the optimal subjective contract
intercept is greater. A shaded region satisfying all three constraints exists if and only if The IC line
is on the left hand of that intercept (see the second panel of Figure 4). In both cases, a minimum
B is required for a solution to exist; and if it does there exists a shaded region and the optimal pair
is the dotted point inside it. (Note that in the latter case, there is a chance that the neither L nor
H is binding when IC just stands strictly in between the two intercepts.14)
It is interesting that B appears in these diagrams, but not in the diagram for S1 (Figure 3). The
reason is that, under S1, the same e¤ort choice (e2 = 1) is called upon under di¤erent IPE outcomes
and hence B disappears in the principals truth telling constraints (11) and (12). It is not the case
under S0.
Proposition 7 Consider the scenario where a subjective IPE is conducted.
14The intuition is that, under the e¤ort-sorting scheme, the cheating motive of the L-type principal is reduced when
B is smaller. When the reduction is large enough, both truth telling constraints become binding even when O0 is
used.
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1. Suppose t
0
1
t00
> t1t0 . The action plan h1; 1; 0i is implementable if and only if B 
(t0+t1 t00 t01)
(t1 t01)
c2
t1
:
2. Suppose t
0
1
t00
< t1t0 . The action plan h1; 1; 0i is implementable if and only if B 
(t0+t1)
t1
c2
t1
.
3. Suppose h1; 1; 0i is implementable. The optimal contract S1 satises bL = wL = 0; bH = c2t1 ;
and wH = max
n
t01B   (t00 + t01) c2t1 ; 0
o
:
Result 1 claries the conditions under which the e¤ort-sorting scheme is implementable. Result
2 of Proposition 4 characterizes the optimal contract. Unlike an objective IPE, in which the optimal
milestone contract satises wH = 0, a subjective IPE may dictate a positive wH . The type-H
principal can distinguish herself from the type-L principal by setting a relative low b or a relative
high w, because setting a reward b is more costly for the type-H than for the type-L, while setting a
w generates the same cost for the two types of principals. However, bH cannot be lowered, because
it is the minimal requirement of bonus to induce high Stage-2 e¤ort after revealing H. Hence, to
deter cheating, wH might be more high-powered, resulting in greater costs than when an objective
IPE is used.
This result sheds light on the nding by Bewley (1995, 1999) that a wage cut, or a low pay, will
impact the workers future productivity. This link is at odds with the traditional incentive theory,
and it is usually attributed to "low morale." However, by stressing the "signalling" role of previous
payments, our analysis identies that a high wage rate paid out at the interim stage can better
motivate the agent in the next stage, since it allows him to believe in success.
We next compare the implementation cost under S0 with that under T . S0 is preferred to T if
and only if V T   V S0  CT   CS0; where the LHS is the reduction of expected revenue and the
RHS the reduction of expected cost. While the LHS is increasing in B, the RHS is decreasing in
B (CT being independent of B and CS0 and the RHS being decreasing in B because of wH , see
proposition 7.3). Hence, there exists a critical value of B, denoted by BS , such that S0 generates a
higher prot to the principal than T if B  BS . One can easily show that this BS is decreasing in
t01 (for the same reason that B
O is decreasing in t01). Here we summarize our result.
Proposition 8 There exists a cuto¤ BS such that S0 yields a higher (lower) level of prot to the
principal than T if B < BS (B > BS). Moreover, this cuto¤ BS is increasing in c2; t00; and t0 and
decreasing in t01.
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4.3 The value of subjective IPE contracts
Here we rst discuss the optimal choice of contract when subjective IPE is available and then discuss
the comparison of it with respect to the rst best.
Optimal contract Figure 4 depicts the results. There is a downward slopping BS , over which T
is preferred to S0 and below which T is less preferred to S0. This BS plays a similar role as BO
does in objective IPE. Another line B# which is the minimum B to ensure the implementability of
action plan h1; 1; 0i. According to Proposition 7.2, for t01t00 <
t1
t0
, this minimum B is at and equal to
(t0+t1)
t1
c2
t1
; fore t
0
1
t00
> t1t0 , the minimum B is increasing in t
0
1. (It is interesting to note that these two
minimum Bs agree with each other when t
0
1
t00
= t1t0 ; we use B
# to denote this minimum B in general.)
Because B# approaches innity as t01 approaches t
0
1, it must intersect with the downward slopping
BS curve at some t01 < t1. We denote by  the value of t
0
1 at the intersection point. Then for the
range bounded by B# and BS , over which the optimal contract is S0, everywhere else the optimal
contract is T . (Note that, for simplicity, we assume that S1 is always preferred to T 0; in case there
is possible that S1 dominates T , then there will be a vertical strip of region with the t01 = t1 line as
its right hand, over which S1 is the optimal choice.). 15
Comparison with the rst best The comparison of the optimal contract with the rst best is
similar to the one found in the last section with objective IPE. Basically, there will be three horizontal
bands in a diagram like gure 4. In the rst band, the optimal contract implements the rst
best outcome; in the middle band, there is underinvestment in the optimal contract (implementing
h1; 1; 0i rather than h1; 1; 1i); in the bottom band, the optimal contract implements the rst best
outcome (now equal to h1; 1; 0i). However, because of the nature of subjective IPE, h1; 1; 0i may
not be implemented even though the rst best calls for it. This is the new element found in the
comparison.
To conclude, despite our focus on Assumption 1, the following insights prevail: (i) for the prin-
cipal, the subjectivity of the IPE imposes additional constraints on the use of milestone contracts,
making the optimal subjective milestone contract less protable than the optimal objective mile-
15Notice that there are three reasons why S0 may be dominated by T in region F . First, not choosing e2 = 1 when
L signal is received is ine¢ cient; second, the limited liability rents under IPE case are too large; third, the truth
telling constraints on the principal impose not making e¤ort under L-signal is indeed an unwise choice. While the
two reasons also explain why O0 may be dominated by T , the last reason is new here.
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stone contract; (ii) there still exist circumstances in which the optimal subjective milestone contract
payo¤-dominates the optimal traditional milestone contract.16
We have not studied IPE contracts for other action plans, it su¢ ces to point out that our earlier
result regarding S0 that wH  0 and wL = 0 also holds for optimal milestone contracts for action
plans h0; 1; 0i ; h1; 1; 1i ; and h0; 1; 1i. The basic intuition is the same: to prevent the principal from
lying about having observed signal H when she had in fact observed signal L, who claims to have
observed signal H must be ned an amount equal to wH .
5 Discussions and extensions
5.1 More noise
Thus far we assumed that the IPE evaluation is perfectly informative in the sense that, given the
IPE outcome, the agents private information about his own stage-1 e¤ort whether e1 = 1 or
e1 = 0 becomes irrelevant. It is realistic to assume that the IPE evaluation outcome is noisy;
instead of knowing the quality of the interim product, the IPE is to receive a noisy signal of it. For
instance, given a high quality of the interim product, there is a probability q > 0:5 of receiving a
good signal (and 1  q of receiving a bad signal); given a low quality of the interim product, there is
a probability 1  q of receiving a good signal (and q of receiving a bad signal). In preliminary work,
we characterized the objective IPE contract that implements the action plan h1; 1; 1i, nding out
that the comparison of the likelihood ratios is still the main determinant of whether the contract is
more protable than the traditional contract. Because of this, we decided not to pursue it.
Another dose of realism can be added to the subjective IPE case. In the case of subjective IPE,
we assume the IPE outcome is not observed by the agent (nor any correlated signal of it). We found
that IPE is now not as valuable as when it is objective. In fact, it is realistic to assume that the
agent, as well as the court, also observes some positively correlated signal of the IPE outcome. This
scenario can be seen as an intermediate case between the objective IPE case and the subjective IPE
case we have studied. We conjecture that, in this case, the IPE will be more useful than it is in the
subjective IPE studied in this paper.
16 In our analysis, we ignore mixed equilibrium in which a type of principal mixes when uttering message upon
receiving IPE. The primary result for the omission is that we want to implement some deterministic action plan,
whose implementation must involve complete separation of the two types of principal.
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5.2 The agent can destroy evidence
In the previous study of subjective IPE, we assume that the principal has private information on the
interim feedback. However, it is possible that the agent observes the quality of the interim product
and is able to destroy or manipulate the signal in his favor without the principals detection. (We
still assume that the quality itself is unchanged, however.) In this case, in order to implement an
action plan, we need to make sure that the agent has no incentive to destroy evidence, i.e., to lie
about the true quality of the interim product. Without loss of generality, we assume that if nil or
any other message is claimed, the principal holds a belief that signal L is detected by the agent in
this o¤-equilibrium path. We denote by A1 and A0 the optimal contracts that implement action
plans h1; 1; 1i and h1; 1; 0i, respectively.
Consider action plan h1; 1; 1i. The contract O1 will not work because now the agent will lie that
the quality is L even though he has observed H, so as to earn a greater bonus. Suppose, besides
the agent truth telling constraints, the only constraints that may be binding are constraints that
prevent deviation in the second stage. In that case, one can easily show that the new optimal IPE
contract entails that
wH = wL = 0 and bL = bH =
c2
t01
: (15)
This contract is the same as O1 except that now bH is increased so that the agent will not lie when
observing H. (Why wL is not used, as in the case of S1 in which wH is used? intuition!!!) It is easy
to show that the corresponding expected cost is higher than under T . Thus having IPE is actually
harmful for the principal, so long as the action plan remains the same as under T . Thus far, we
assume that the constraint that prevents rst-stage deviation is not binding. If it does, that will
further increase bL and bH , and the domination of IPE contract by T will be even more stark.
Next consider action plan h1; 1; 0i. The contract O0 will not work because now the agent will lie
that the quality is indeed H even though he has observed L, so as to earn bH with some probability.
As a remedy, the optimal contract that implements h1; 1; 0i will entail a positive wL to prevent the
agent from such lying. One can easily show that the contract satises:17
wH = bL = 0; bH =
c2
t1
and wL = (t00=t1)c2: (16)
17 It is interesting to notice a symmetry with respect to S0. Using O0 as a benchmark, under S0, wH is used as the
main instructment to maintain the private information processors truth telling incentive; under the optimal contract
here, wL is used as the main instrument.
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(There also exists another solution similar to the solution of implementing h1; 1; 1i. Instead of using
a positive wL, the principal could set bL = bH = c2=t1, while keeping wH = wL = 0. One can show
that this alternative contract corresponds to the same cost, and all the four truth telling constraints
are satised.) Despite additional rent paid because of the agents adverse selection problem, we can
still identify a range of parameters (e.g., su¢ ciently low B or t01, or su¢ ciently high c2 or t1) to
support the payo¤ dominance of the e¤ort-sorting scheme over traditional contract.18
Proposition 9 1. Suppose c1=c2 is su¢ ciently small. The contract that implements h1; 1; 1i is
characterized by (15). The agent cost under the IPE contract is greater than under T (this
does not rely on the assumption of c1=c2 being su¢ ciently large).
2. The contract that implements h1; 1; 0i is characterized by (16). There exist parameter values
under which the IPE contract is more protable than T .
It is useful to compare this proposition to early propositions about subjective IPE. The second
result here is quite similar to those found earlier and does not require more elaboration. However,
result 1 is not the case. Despite the apparent symmetry of this model with the subjective IPE,
in which the principal has private information about the IPE outcome, we note two di¤erences.
The rst is the characterization of the IPE contract. In the principal-private-information case, the
separation instrument is wage, rather than bonus; in the agent-has-private-information case, the
separation instrument is bonus, rather than wage. Second, there is also an asymmetry regarding
the protability of the IPE contracts that implement the same action plan. In the principal-private-
information case, the IPE contract may still be protable; in this agent-private-information case,
the IPE will never be protable.
5.3 The agent has unknown ability
In this paper, we assumed that there is only one type of agent and his productivity is commonly
known. In reality, the agent may have di¤erent abilities and may not be certain about his exact
productivity. To x idea, consider the following modication to the model in section 3. Suppose
there are two types of agent: h (high) and l (low), and it is commonly believed that the agent is of
18 In the section on Subjective IPE contract, we found that implementation is an issue for action plan 110. The reason
is that in taht case B enters into the principals truth telling constraints and so the aciton plan is not implementable
for some range of B. In the current model, however, B does not enter into the agents truth telling constraints and
thus the problem does not arise.
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high type with probability of ! 2 (0; 1). Although both types having the same costs regarding their
e¤ort, the h-type agent is more productive than is the l-type, in the following sense. The i-type
agents stage-1 e¤ort increases the success probability of the interim product by probability ir1; his
stage-2 e¤ort increases the success probability of the nal product by probability it1 (it01) when
the interim product is high quality (low quality), where h > l. We continue to focus on the case
where c1=c2 is su¢ ciently small and the optimal traditional contract is to implement action plan
h1; 1i.
Suppose objective IPE is used. Upon a low quality through the IPE, the agent will now be less
condent not only because the quality is low but also because the probability of his being low-typed
is higher than previously thought and hence the success probability of stage-2 e¤ort is even slimmer.
Thus, we conjecture that the main advantage of the IPE compared with the traditional contract is
attributable more to the fact that it allows the principal to give di¤erent instruments to the agent
conditional on the IPE outcome (to implement h1; 1; 0i) than to the fact that it incentivizes with a
lower cost the same e¤ort in the stage 2 under both H and L IPE outcome (to implement h1; 1; 1i).
Notice that given our assumptions, the principal will never be certain about the type of the agent
even with the help of the IPE. However, we can envision scenarios in which the type of the agent
is truly conrmed. For instance, suppose, with e¤ort e1 = 1, a h-type agent will always create an
interim product of high quality, while a l-type agent will create an interim product of either quality
with positive probability. In this case, the agent is certain to be of l-type once a L IPE signal is
observed. The bottom line is that IPE allows the principal to enhance her knowledge about the
innate ability of the agent, and this provides an additional rationale why IPE may be contemplated.
We leave this interesting issue for future studies.
5.4 The opportunity of correction
In reality, an early stage has resulted in a poor outcome may be repeated. The opportunity to
redo the rst task is an additional reason why conducing an IPE is benecial to the principal. The
simplest model to consider is the same model as in Section 2, except that, upon receiving the IPE
outcome, the principal is allowed to ask the agent or somebody else to redo the Stage-1 task. Assume
that (i) a task can only be redone once; (ii) redoing a task incurs an extra cost I to the principal due
to the delay in project completion, additional materials, etc.; and (iii) redoing the rst task is like
starting it afresh, and previous experience is of no use in the second attempt. The nal assumption
27
has two implications. First, redoing the rst task is valuable only if a L-signal is obtained. Second,
in redoing the task, it is better to hire a new agent, for the following reason. If the original agent is
retained, he would gain positive rent even though he failed to pass the milestone in the rst attempt,
hence the original moral hazard problem would be exacerbated.
The basic trade-o¤ of imposing a correction is that subsequent to a poor IPE outcome, hiring
a new agent to redo the previous task increases the probability of achieving the nal success; but
the likelihood of being red makes it more costly to motivate the rst agent, due to the worsened
agency problem in Stage 1 as well as extra di¢ culty upon information disclosure. Thus, correction
is favored by a larger B, but disfavored by a larger c1=c2 or I. One shall be able to nd parameter
values with which the optimal traditional contract (i) dominates any subjective milestone contract
without the redo option and (ii) is dominated by some subjective milestone contracts with the redo
option.
5.5 Multiple agents
Midterm reviews have also received signicant attention in the recent literature on dynamic tour-
nament. Some of these papers, including Yildirim (2005), Aoyagi (2008), Goltsman and Mukherjee
(2009), Ederer (forthcoming), try to characterize the optimal strategy of interim information disclo-
sure in the context of a two-stage tournament. Moreover, Gershkov and Perry (2009), while keeping
a xed disclosure policy, investigate the optimal aggregation and compensation rules in a tournament
with or without midterm reviews. However, our model is built upon the standard principal-agent set-
ting, instead of with multiple-agent competition. Another di¤erence is that the contracting problem
in our model goes hand in hand with information disclosure and morale formation.
5.6 Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation
The seminal work by Bénabou and Tirole (2003) studies the interplay between extrinsic incentive
and intrinsic motivation. In that paper, the authors introduce notions such as self-condence, trust,
etc., into a specic class of principal agent model. As is in a standard principal agent model, the
principal wants the agent to exert some e¤ort to achieve some goal and the e¤ort is costly. What
is novel is that the agent does not know his own ability as much as the principal does and that
the agent will receive some utility from achieving the goal (hence the name of intrinsic motivation).
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The Bayesian equilibrium is thus characterized by di¤erent types of principal giving di¤erent reward
schemes to the agent, who infers that his ability is lower when he is promised a more powered reward.
Benahue and Tirole are therefore able to relate notions, such as self-condence, that are foreign to
economics but popular in pyschology and education.
Notice that our model of objective IPE suggests that the "low ability" agent be given a stronger
incentive, with the interpretation that "ability" corresponds to the quality outcome of the rst stage
of production. In this sense the result resembles that of Banahue and Tirole and in fact we have
attributed the necessity of stronger incentive to non-economic notions such as the low morale or lack
of self condence of the agent. Notice that in our model there is no assymetric information at the
outset Benahue and Tirole assume there is and the agent does not have an intrinsic motivation
to complete the tasks Benabue and Tirole assume there is. Our main point, therefore, is that
notions such as low morale and self condence have their justiable places in even broader economic
environments.19
5.7 Empirical relevance
To be lled in.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied a 2-stage principal-agent model with di¤erent specications. We have
shown that using an IPE may boost the principals prot even though he did not plan to condition
the continuation action plan on the IPE outcome. We have claried the conditions under which
the IPE is valuable. These conditions can be expressed in terms of e¤ort complementarity, as well
as the comparison between the likelihood ratios under di¤erent IPE outcomes. Albeit weaker, the
domination of the IPE contract over the traditional contract still exists under subjective IPE where
the principals incentive to lie is a concern.
There are two directions that future studies can pursue. One is to weaken the assumption that
the IPE outcome always reveals perfectly the quality of the interim product. Given the current
modeling, the private information the agent possesses about whether he has exerted e¤ort becomes
19The subjective IPE case also has a relevant connection with Benabue and Tirole (2003). There "ability" corre-
sponds to quality outcome of the rst step in the production process. Moreover, the "ability" is the principals private
information.
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irrelevant once the IPE outcome is known. Although with preliminary work we have shown that our
main result is robust to a switch to noisy IPEs, we look forward to understanding the role of the
degree of noisiness in IPEs in contracting. Another direction we look forward to is re-visiting the
issue when e¤orts are substitutes, rather than complements.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose the principal wants to implement the action plan hx; y; zi. No matter what x, y and
z are, wL should be zero in the cost-minimized contract, since it helps nothing except for diluting
the incentive in Stage 1. Then we consider the choice of wH . It incentivizes the Stage-1 e¤ort, so it
would be useful only if x = 1. However, we claim that wH cannot be a more cost-e¢ cient instrument
than bH is for inducing e1 = 1.
Consider the case where x = 1. If the principal increases one unit of wH , the cost is (r0 + r1),
while the Stage-1 IC constraints would be relaxed by the amount of r1. However, if the principal
increases one unit of bH , the cost is (r0 + r1) (t0 + yt1); the IC constraints for preventing deviation
to h0; y; zi would be relaxed by r1 (t0 + yt1), while the IC constraints for preventing deviation to
h0; 0; 0i is relaxed by the amount of [r0t1 + r1 (t0 + t1)]. So by comparing the cost-benet ratio, we
found that bH is at least as cost-e¢ cient as wH for relaxing relevant IC constraints.
The non-equivalence between wH and bH when IPE outcome is noisy
Here we show why in general Lemma 1 does not hold when the IPE outcome is noisy. Consider the
following changes to the model presented in Section 2: Given that the intermediate good is of good
(bad) quality, the IPE signal is H with probability q (1  q) and L with probability 1  q (q), where
q > 1=2. Then the expected cost of implementing action plan h1; 1; 1i equals
C = (r0 + r1) [q (wH + (t0 + t1) bH) + (1  q) (wL + (t0 + t1) bL)]
+ (1  r0   r1) [(1  q) (wH + (t00 + t01) bH) + q (wL + (t00 + t01) bL)] :
Therefore we reckon that
dC
dwH
= (2q   1) (r0 + r1) + (1  q) > 0
dC
dbH
= (r0 + r1) (q (t0 + t1)  (1  q) (t00 + t10)) + (r00 + r10) (1  q) > 0:
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To show that in general it is using bH and using wH are di¤erent, here we consider the IC constraint
that prevents deviation to action plan h0; 1; 1i is as follows:
(r0 + r1) [q (wH + (t0 + t1) bH) + (1  q) (wL + (t0 + t1) bL)]
+ (1  r0   r1) [(1  q) (wH + (t00 + t01) bH) + q (wL + (t00 + t01) bL)]  c1   c2
> r0 [q (wH + (t0 + t1) bH) + (1  q) (wL + (t0 + t1) bL)]
+ (1  r0) [(1  q) (wH + (t00 + t01) bH) + q (wL + (t00 + t01) bL)]  c2
Rearranging, we have
r1 [q (wH + (t0 + t1) bH)  (1  q) (wH + (t00 + t01) bH)]  c1
> r1 [+q (wL + (t
0
0 + t
0
1) bL)  (1  q) (wL + (t0 + t1) bL)] ;
where wH and bH appear only in the LHS. Denote by dIC=dwH and dIC=dbH the amount the IC
constraint is relaxed by one unit increase of wH and of bH , respectively. It is straightforward to
show that
dIC
dwH
= r1 (2q   1) > 0
and
dIC
dbH
=
2q   1
q (t0 + t1)  (1  q) (t00 + t01)
> 0:
The cost-benet ratio of using wH is
dC
dwH
dIC
dwH
=
r0 + r1
r1
+
1
2q   1
1  q
r1
and the cost-benet ratio of using bH is
dC
dbH
dIC
dbH
=
r0 + r1
r1
+
t00 + t
0
1
q (t0 + t1)  (1  q) (t00 + t01)
1  q
r1
=
r0 + r1
r1
+
1
q

t0+t1
(t00+t01)
+ 1

  1
1  q
r1

dC
dwH
dIC
dwH
;
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where the equality holds if and only if q = 1. Therefore, for q 2 (0:5; 1), it is strictly better to use
bH instead of wH to provide incentive for the agent in the rst stage.
Proof of Proposition 1 (characterization of O1)
Proof. Part 1. The cost minimization problem for inducing action plan h1; 1; 1i is as follows:
min
wH ;wL;bH ;bL
CO1 = (r0 + r1)wH + (1  r0   r1)wL
+(r0 + r1) (t0 + t1) bH + (1  r0   r1) (t00 + t01) bL;
subject to the following IC constraints: the IC constraints that prevent deviation to h1; 0; 1i and
h1; 1; 0i, respectively (i.e., (5) and (6); the IC constraint that prevents deviation to h0; 1; 1i (i.e., (7));
and the IC constraint that prevents deviation to h0; 0; 0i:
[r0t1 + r1 (t0 + t1)] bH + [(1  r0) t01   r1 (t00 + t01)] bL
+r1 (wH   wL)  c1 + c2;
(17)
The claim that wO1H = w
O1
L = 0 is obtained from Lemma 1. To nd out the bonuses, let us dene
  r1t0
t1
  r1t
0
0
t01
:
We can verify that that (i) If c1 < c2, only (5) and (6) are binding and others constraints are
non-binding; as a result, bH and bL satisfy bO1H =
c2
t1
; bO1L =
c2
t01
:(ii) If c1  c2, only (6) and (7) are
binding and others are non-binding; as a result bH and bL satisfy
bO1H =
c1
r1 (t0 + t1)
+
(t00 + t
0
1) c2
(t0 + t1) t01
;
bO1L =
c2
t01
:
(Note that in any case, (17) is a non-binding constraints. It can be explained by one-deviation
property.) (iii) c1 < c2 if and only if
c2
t1
>
c1
r1 (t0 + t1)
+
(t00 + t
0
1) c2
(t0 + t1) t01
.
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Hence, (i) to (iii) establish the claim that bO1H = max

c2
t1
; c1r1(t0+t1) +
(t00+t
0
1)c2
(t0+t1)t01

and bO1L =
c2
t01
:
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Part 2. We now compare implementation costs. To simplify notation, we dene
R  (r0 + r1) ;
H  R (t0 + t1) ; L  (1 R) (t00 + t01) ;
then using (3) and (4) we reckon that CT = (H + L) bT . Suppose c1 < c2 where   r1t0t1  
r1t
0
0
t01
.
Then bO1H = c2=t1 and, with some manipulation, we have
CO1 = (HH + LL) b
T
where
H 
[Rt1 + (1 R) t01]
t1
; L 
[Rt1 + (1 R) t01]
t01
:
Hence
CT   CO1 = (H + L) bT   (HH + LL) bT
= [H (1  H) + L (1  L)] bT :
Substituting the following into the expression
1  H = 1 
[Rt1 + (1 R) t01]
t1
=
(1 R) (t1   t01)
t1
and
1  L = 1 
[Rt1 + (1 R) t01]
t01
=  R (t1   t
0
1)
t01
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and with some manipulation, we obtain
CT   CO1 =

R (1 R) (t1   t01)
(t0 + t1)
t1
 R (1 R) (t1   t01)
(t00 + t
0
1)
t01

bT
=

R (1 R) (t1   t01)

t0 + t1
t1
  t
0
0 + t
0
1
t01

bT
= R (1 R) (t1   t01)

t0
t1
  t
0
0
t01

bT :
Since bT > 0 and t1 > t01, C
T   CO1  0 if and only if
t0
t1
 t
0
0
t01
:
Next, we consider the case where c1  c2. In this case,
bO1H =
c1
r1 (t0 + t1)
+
(t00 + t
0
1) c2
(t0 + t1) t01
>
c2
t1
;
and the above calculation underestimates the true CO1. Hence, a fortiori, it must hold true that
CO1 > CT when t0t1 <
t00
t01
.
To conclude, given t0t1 <
t00
t01
, CT < CO1. Given t0t1 <
t00
t01
; for su¢ ciently small c1=c2, we have
CT > CO1. The proof is thus complete.
Proof of Proposition 3 (Characterization of O0)
Proof. When implementing h1; 1; 0i, the principals cost-minimization problem is as follows.
minCO0 = (r0 + r1) (t0 + t1) bH + (1  r0   r1) t00bL
+(r0 + r1)wH + (1  r0   r1)wL;
subject to the following IC constraints.
The IC constraint that prevents deviation to h1; 0; 0i is (??). The IC constraint that prevents
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deviation to h0; 0; 0i is
[(r0 + r1) t1 + r1t0] bH   r1t00bL (18)
+r1 (wH   wL)  c1 + (r0 + r1) c2:
The IC constraint that prevents deviation to h0; 1; 0i is
r1 (t0 + t1) bH   r1t00bL + r1 (wH   wL)  c1 + r1c2: (19)
First, let note that a positive bL or wL only dilutes incentive in Stage 1, so both of them should
be zero. Moreover, according to Lemma 1, wH is less cost-e¢ cient than bH in relaxing the Stage-1
IC constraint. In the optimal O0 contract, only bH is positive, while others equal to zero. Second,
given Assumption 1, only (??) would be binding among all the IC constraints, so bO0H =
c2
t1
.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We reckon that the implementation cost of O0 is
CO0 =
(r0 + r1) (t0 + t1) c2
t1
:
Implementing O0 is more protable than implementing T , i.e.,
V O0   CO0 > V T   CT
if and only if
(1  r0   r1) t01B <

(r0 + r1) t0 + (1  r0   r1) t00
(r0 + r1) t1 + (1  r0   r1) t01
c2
  (r0 + r1) t0
t1
c2

+ (1  r0   r1) c2:
or B < BO, where
BO  1
(1  r0   r1) t01

(r0 + r1) t0 + (1  r0   r1) t00
(r0 + r1) t1 + (1  r0   r1) t01
c2   (r0 + r1) t0
t1
c2

+
c2
t01
:
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It is straightforward to show that BO is increasing in c2; t00; t0, but is decreasing in t
0
1.
proof of Proposition 6 (characterization of subjective IPE, S1)
Proof. For c1=c2 su¢ ciently small, we reckon that the implementation cost of S1 is
CS1 = (r0 + r1) (t0 + t1   t00   t01)
c2
t1
+ (t00 + t
0
1)
c2
t01
:
Di¤erentiating it with respect to t01, we have
@CS1
@t01
=   (r0 + r1) c2
t1
  t
0
0
(t01)
2 c2
Di¤erentiating CT , (4), with respect to t01, we have
@CT
@t01
=   (1  r0   r1) [(r0 + r1) t0 + (1  r0   r1) t
0
0]
[(r0 + r1) t1 + (1  r0   r1) t01]2
c2
Focusing at the point where t01 = t1, we have
@CS1
@t01

t01=t1
=  

r0 + r1 +
t00
t1

c2
t1
< 0
and
@CT
@t01

t01=t1
=   (1  r0   r1) [(r0 + r1) t0 + (1  r0   r1) t
0
0]
t21
c2 < 0:
It is easy to show that
@CS1
@t01

t01=t1
>
@CS1
@t01

t01=t1
if and only if
(1  r0   r1) (t0   t00) > t1 + t00: (20)
Notice that if t01 =
t00
t0
t1, CS1  CO1 = CT and if t01 = t1, CS1 = CT : Altogether, this suggests that
there exists  2 ((t00=t0) t1; t1) such that for all t01 2 (; t1), the implementation cost under S1 is
lower than under T . This completes the proof. (Notice that the condition (20) is very restrictive
but is not impossible. For example, when r0 + r1 = 0:4; t0 = 0:5; t00 := 0; then the t1 that satises
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this condition can be as high as 0.3. If t01 is close to 0.3 as well, then t
0
1=t0 is extremely high. But
this is precisely what makes IPE useful.)
Proof of Proposition 7 (characterization of subjective IPE)
Proof. To characterize the optimal contract S0, let note that the cost-minimization problem is the
same as described in the proof of Proposition 2, except that (13) and (14) are added. Then we claim
that the choice of wL and bL should be zero, because they strain the IC constraints but cannot relax
the truth-telling constraints.
Using the graphical method described in the main text, we nd that
(1) When t
0
1
t00
> t1t0 (refer to panel a of Figure 4), the "IC" line should be in the left of the crossing
point of two truth-telling constraints. The corresponding condition is
B >
(t0 + t1   t00   t01)
(t1   t01)
c2
t1
:
(2)When t
0
1
t00
< t1t0 (refer to panel b of Figure 4)the "IC" line should be in the left of the intercept
of the "H" line with the horizontal axis. The corresponding condition is
B >
(t0 + t1)
t1
c2
t1
:
So the two necessary conditions of implementation is summarized in Part (i) of the Proposition.
The remaining work is to characterize the cost-minimal contract among all the feasible solutions.
The optimal choice is depicted by the dark point, and the choices of bH and wH are presented in
Part (3).
Proof of Proposition 8 (value of subjective IPE)
Proof. We compare S0 with T . S0 payo¤-dominates T if
V T   V S0  CT   CS0: (21)
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In case that wH > 0, (21) is equivalent to
(1  r0   r1) t01B 

(r0 + r1) t0 + (1  r0   r1) t00
(r0 + r1) t1 + (1  r0   r1) t01
c2   (r0 + r1) t0
t1
c2

+(1  r0   r1) c2   (r0 + r1)

t01B   (t00 + t01)
c2
t1

;
which is rearranged to
B  B0  1
t01

(r0 + r1) t0 + (1  r0   r1) t00
(r0 + r1) t1 + (1  r0   r1) t01
  (r0 + r1) t0
t1

c2
+
1
t01
(1  r0   r1) c2 + (r0 + r1) (t
0
0 + t
0
1)
t01
c2
t1
:
On the other hand, in case that wH = 0, (21) is equivalent to B  BO. Thus, BS is dened as
follows.
BS = min

B0; BO
	
:
It is clear that S0 is implementable and yields a higher prot than T , if B#  B  BS . The
remaining work is to prove that such range of B does exists.
Claim 1 There exists   t00t0 t1 such that if t01 < , the range of

B#; BS

exists; if t01  , no
range of B exists to support the optimality of choosing the e¤ort sorting scheme.
First, if t01 =
t00
t0
t1,
BS  BO = 1
t01
(t0 + t1)
t1
c2  1
t1
(t0 + t1)
t1
c2 = B
#;
Second, if t01 ! t1,
B# =1 > BS :
Third, we know that BS is decreasing in t01, while B
# is weakly increasing in t01. Thus, according
to intermediate value theorem, we could nd a   t00t0 t1 satisfying the claim.
Thus, in combination with Claim 1, the proof is completed.
Proof of Proposition 9 (the agent can destroy evidence)
Proof. Consider contract A1, which is to implement action plan h1; 1; 1i. The agents truth telling
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constraints are the following. The rst constraint is no incentive to misreporting L when actually
observing H.
(t0 + t1) bH   c2 + wH  max f(t0 + t1) bL   c2 + wL; t0bL + wLg ; (22)
where the LHS is the payo¤ when he truthfully reports and exerts e¤ort e2 = 1, and the RHS is the
maximum payo¤ between two possible deviations: reporting L and exerting e¤ort versus reporting
L and not exerting e¤ort.
The second IC constraint is no incentive to misreporting H when actually observing L.
(t00 + t
0
1) bL   c2 + wL  max f(t00 + t01) bH   c2 + wH ; t00bH + wHg ; (23)
where the LHS is the payo¤ when he truthfully reports and exerts e¤ort according to the plan, and
the RHS is the maximum payo¤ between two possible deviations: reporting H and exerting e¤ort
versus reporting H and not exerting e¤ort.
Note that the RHS of (22) describes the payo¤when the agent claims L but still exerts high e¤ort
in Stage 2. However, when observing L, the agent would not cheat by claiming H. Now consider
the milestone contract that implements h1; 1; 0i. When observing H, the agent would not cheat by
claiming L, if
(t0 + t1) bH   c2 + wH  t0bL + wL; (24)
when observing L, the agent would not cheat by claiming H, if
t00bL + wL  (t00 + t01) bH   c2 + wH : (25)
(t0 + t1) bH   c2 + wH  t0bL + wL: (26)
We claim that as long as bL = c2t01 , (26) would not be binding, because
(t0 + t1) bL + wL   c2 > t0bL + wL;
,
(t0 + t1) bL   t0bL = t1 c2
t01
> c2:
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When observing L, the agent would not cheat by claiming H, if
(t00 + t
0
1) bL   c2 + wL  (t00 + t01) bH   c2 + wH ; (27)
and
(t00 + t
0
1) bL   c2 + wL  t00bH + wH : (28)
(27) is binding in case that bH  c2t01 , while (28) is binding in case that bH <
c2
t01
.
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